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Abstract—The paper describes a pragmatic solution to the
parallel execution of hard real-time tasks on off-the-shelf em-
bedded multiprocessors. We propose a simple timing isolation
protocol allowing computational tasks to communicate with hard
real-time ones. Excellent parallel resource utilization can be
achieved while preserving timing compositionality. An extension
to a synchronous language enables the correct-by-construction
compilation to efficient parallel code. We do not explicitly address
certification issues at this stage, yet our approach is designed to
enable full system certification at the highest safety standards,
such as SIL 4 in IEC 61508 or DAL A in DO-178B.
Index Terms—Mixed criticalities, Multi-core, Embedded real-
time system, Synchronous Language, Time-triggered execution
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents the design of a synchronous language
enabling hard real-time applications to run on off-the-shelf
multi-core platforms.1 The language and methodology ensure
the isolation of time-critical tasks from the non-time-critical
ones under the following three hypotheses:
1) most of the computational load takes place in non-time-
critical tasks;
2) it is possible to program the reaction to the absence of
timely data, when non-time-critical tasks are delayed;
3) the target multiprocessor provides means to strictly
prioritize memory accesses of one or more processors
executing time-critical tasks, or to fully isolate such
accesses into a scratch-pad memory; and the target also
supports asymmetric multiprocessing (e.g., bare-metal
execution on one core and Linux on another).
We illustrate our approach and validate it on a train signaling
use case provided by Alstom Transport. It is representative
of the complexity in terms of vital/non-vital code interweav-
ing, operational performance and availability constraints. The
system function is called “Passenger Exchange” (PE). This
function takes control of the train when safely docked at a
station; it organizes the exchange of passengers (train and
station doors opening/closing) while protecting them from
any untimely train movement or non-aligned doors opening,
and finally gives the departure authorization when all safety
conditions are met. The functional specification is made of
1This work is supported by the Technological Research Institute (IRT)
SystemX, partially funded by the French public program “Investissement
d’Avenir”. It is also partially funded by the EMC2 ECSEL and ITEA
ASSUME projects.
more than 300 requirements (natural language and SysML),
and the system function is composed of about twenty sub-
functions.
The PE application is partitioned into tasks, some of them
being safety-critical and hard real-time, and some of them
being mission-critical but non-vital. These tasks expose input
and output signals and may result from the compilation of
a synchronous block-diagram language. Unlike most related
work on mixed criticality [2], dependences and communication
among tasks of different criticality are allowed. There is a
simple reason why we can afford such a breach of criticality
partitions: our approach composes tasks of different time-
criticalities, without relaxing any other validation requirement.
In other words, all tasks may still be certified at the highest
(relevant) level of safety, but we acknowledge that only a
subset of the tasks needs to be time-predictable and validated
against real-time constraints. Let us discuss this hypothesis on
the PE application. The computation of the doors that are safe
to open (e.g., because they are not aligned) is safety-critical, as
well as the task preventing train departure if safety conditions
are not met (e.g. the doors are open or opening). Less vital
tasks are in charge of operating doors with respect to the mis-
sion and to a time table; these are still mission-critical since the
quality of service depends on the rare occurrence of timeouts.
In this example we identify two occurrences of mission-critical
to safety-critical communication. First, in order to ensure that
door commands (mission-critical) do not lead to an accident,
they must be checked against the enabled set of doors (safety-
critical). Second, the departure authorization (safety-critical)
must be computed regarding door commands to ensure that no
opening commands will be executed after the authorization has
been given. Such communication patterns are quite common
in the case study.
In this paper, we will be using a modified version of the
PE application. These modifications decouple computational
aspects of the original safety-critical components. These com-
putational tasks are amenable to parallelization and aggressive
optimization, while satisfying a relaxed set of soft real time
constraints. As a result, a safety critical component is split
into a non-time-critical and a time-critical task, both of them
being certified at the highest levels of safety. On the other
hand, several less critical components with no connection to
safety critical tasks have been coalesced for didactic reasons.
In the following, we focus on the validation of the hard
real time requirements of the time-critical components of the
system. The difficulty being that interferences on shared buses
and caches of conventional multicores make it impossible in
general to establish a practically useful worst-case execution
time of a given task [16]. Our goal is to design a software
stack and composition methodology enabling hard real-time
control code to be isolated from timing interference, while
exploiting parallelism among non-time-critical tasks, and still
allowing for communications between the two. To solve this
apparently paradoxical and infeasible set of constraints, our
language provides an automatic inference mechanism for
“late” communications between time-criticality levels. Time
compositionality may be implemented through mode changes,
and introduced incrementally into existing design and valida-
tion flows.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Thread-level parallelism has become unavoidable in any
area where performance matters. While specific designs
are emerging that combine predictability and performance—
e.g. [16]—off-the-shelf multiprocessors designed for mass-
market areas are not well suited to timing analysis. Indeed, it is
necessary to establish strict bounds on the worst case execution
time (WCET) to address the time-predicability requirements of
safety-critical systems [19]. If contention of shared resources
can not be avoided, the complexity and imprecision of these
techniques worsens dramatically. A survey of these researches
can be found in a recent paper [12]. Our approach is not
to improve timing analyses themselves, but to make those
more effective by controlling how the system is designed, from
specification to code generation. We also hope to reduce the
reliance on timing analysis on large parts of its code: ideally,
most of the software components would not need a fully safe
worst-case execution time characterization, even though the
full system remains globally time-predictable and provably
safe.
We are interested in mass-market commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) platforms, but we believe our approach will also be
applied to more predictable classes of multiprocessors, such
as the Kalray MPPA [14], [8], increasing resource efficiency.
Such extensions are left for future work. Numerous hardware
components impact WCET analysis on multiprocessors [7],
such as shared caches and shared busses, etc. The main solu-
tions attempt to reduce the general problem to a composition
of sequential WCET analyses, enforcing a strict isolation at
all levels of the memory hierarchy. For example, software-
cache partitioning has been realized for ARM Cortex A9
[18], and other approaches using scratch-pad and multi-ported
memories are also possible. Our proposal builds on these ideas
to implement spatial and temporal partitioning.
Our proposal was also inspired by the Logical Execution
Time (LET) paradigm [15] where the correctness of the system
relies on observable input and output times independently
of the actual execution time of the system’s components.
We extend LET with communications across time-criticality
partitions, introducing a new protocol for tightly controlling
timing isolation. We also leverage the multiple levels of time-
criticality in real-world safety-critical applications to relax the
timing isolation of parts of the system, improving overall
efficiency and reducing certification costs without jeopardizing
the safety of the full system. This approach has also been ap-
plied to Automotive control applications, but without enforcing
hard timing isolation and compositionality [4].
Finally, when compared with the state of the art in mixed-
criticality real-time scheduling, our paper proposes a totally
different approach. Isolation between low-criticality and high-
criticality components is ensured not only temporally, but also
functionally, by means of language design and code gener-
ation. This approach is fully complementary to the mixed-
criticality task models proposed in the real-time scheduling
community. As such, it could be a contribution towards
aligning academic work on mixed-criticality systems with the
notion of mixed criticality introduced in industry standards
[11].
III. A MIXED-TIME-CRITICAL SYNCHRONOUS LANGUAGE
We designed a simple mixed-time-critical extension of an
existing synchronous dataflow language: HEPTAGON [13].2
It is a research language and compiler with a LUSTRE-
like syntax, analogous to the textual language of SCADE
SUITE.3 HEPTAGON features state of the art constructs such
as finite state machines and functional arrays with in-place
operations. Its compiler implements a clock calculus upon
which the generation of efficient embedded code is built,4 and
a number of optimizations to reduce control flow and memory
management overhead.
The original PE application has been completely imple-
mented in HEPTAGON, with only low-level I/O and system
calls implemented in C. This choice allowed to faithfully
implement the original specification, facilitating the applica-
tion of formal methods or manual certification procedures.
Although using mainly a natural language, the specification
describes the functions to be implemented in an equational
way which suits easily a dataflow language. HEPTAGON has
been used to describe the tasks themselves as well as the
target-specific code which describes how tasks communicate.
We were also able to compile and test the different com-
ponents early, then proceed with their integration and static
scheduling, preserving timing isolation in a compositional
way. In later development and validation stages, the tasks have
been identified and mapped to specific processors, scheduled
and executed in separation, with no functional changes to
the program and reusing its high-level communication code.
The detailed presentation and discussion of the parallelization
and distribution features is out of the scope of the paper
(some of the principles can be found in Gérard et al. [5] and
2See http://heptagon.gforge.inria.fr for documentation, source code and
applications.
3http://www.esterel-technologies.com/products/scade-suite.
4Clocks can be seen as a type system for sequences of boolean conditions
controlling the presence or the absence of values in stream variables, or the
stepping of synchronous, stateful nodes in a process network.
Delaval et al. [9]). Instead, we outline the proposed extensions
to HEPTAGON, and in particular how to programmatically
control what happens when a task misses its deadline. For this
purpose, we extend our language with the notion of “tasks”
and “punctuality”.
A task is defined as a dataflow node which is the smallest
partition of the synchronous program after static scheduling
and code generation. Tasks may then be amenable to dynamic
or time-triggered scheduling. A task is a reactive program,
a property inherited from HEPTAGON nodes: it activates re-
peatedly in response to a signal, its inputs need to be present
before it activates (dataflow semantics) and the task’s outputs
are present after it terminates its reaction. After the beginning
of the task and before its end, the task does not communicate
with any other task. It is the programmer’s duty to choose
which dataflow nodes in the node instantiation tree will be
tasks and thus to define the granularity at which the application
is deployed on the target platform.
If ever a task were to be instantiated inside another task, the
compiler would simply ignore this information and continue as
if the task was a simple node. This does not guarantee time and
space isolation across the “embedded” and “embedding” task,
but we found it sufficient to ensure time and space isolation
across top-level tasks in the system.
Note: the HEPTAGON language allows the programmer to
declare “external” nodes and tasks which can be resolved at
link time. This allows specific nodes to be written in plain C.
A task is called unpunctual if it is not time-critical. In this
case, the task can miss its deadline. It may be left to run
to completion, ignoring its outputs, or it may be killed or
preempted by the system. When it happens, the outputs of
the task are not present. To reflect this possibility, we say
that the outputs of the task are also unpunctual. We extend
the type system of HEPTAGON by assigning a punctuality
to each variable and each task. Our language requires that
the punctuality of the output variables is always the same
as the punctuality of the task. These unpunctual values can
be transmitted to other nodes. However, to exploit these
values, the programmer must distinguish two cases: either
the value has been computed on time or the unpunctual
computation timed out and it is not available. The operator
ontime takes an unpunctual variable argument and returns
a boolean which evaluates to true when the variable can be
read. In other words, the expression ontime v is the clock
of the unpunctual variable v. This means that the merge
operator—combining multiple flows with mutually exclusive
clocks in HEPTAGON—can be used to build a punctual value
by combining the actual value when present and a “default”
value otherwise.
In many cases, the “default” value to be used in place of the
actual value when a task missed its deadline is a static constant.
This happens when there is a value which is always safe. For
instance in our case, it is always safe that the component
sends no commands or to considers that there is no door
correspondence. The programmer can then give a default value
to the unpunctual variable which will be used when the actual
value is not available. When an unpunctual variable is set to
its default value, its clock is the one of the node. (Or the one
explicitly declared if it is different.) Sometimes, specifying a
default value is not powerful enough. For instance, in Model
Predictive Control (MPC), a more suitable reaction may be to
repeat the command issued in the last cycle but following a
suboptimal, faster prediction [17], [1].
IV. MIXED-TIME-CRITICAL FLOW AND PLATFORM
We review the tool flow and run-time support for the
compilation and execution of synchronous programs with
multiple levels of time criticality.
A. Compilation
The extensions to HEPTAGON require three main changes.
1) The task keyword is a synonym of node. It is sup-
ported as an annotation in the intermediate representa-
tion, which can then be read by the back-end to generate
a scheduling table [6] or communication code.
2) The type system is extended with a punctuality property.
3) A transformation pass abstracts the punctuality infor-
mation such that the resulting program have the same
semantics but is lowered to conventional synchronous
code without the mixed-time-criticality constructions.
Further down, the usual compilation flow can be applied.
We add a “punctuality” attribute to the type of expressions
and variables. The type system verifies that variables assigned
from an unpunctual task application are also unpunctual and
that unpunctual variables may only be passed as argument
when the corresponding parameter is also unpunctual. The new
construct ontime is always typed as boolean.
The additional transformation pass uses clocks to represent
the punctuality. Each unpunctual variable is split into two
variables: one is a boolean signal representing whether the
value has been computed on time or not, the other is the actual
value which is only defined on the former clock. The ontime
v expression for any variable v is translated to either true
if the variable v is punctual or to the clock of v otherwise.
A task with an unpunctual parameter is split the same way.
HEPTAGON allows one parameter to be the clock of another
and thus supports this construction.
When a default value is provided for an unpunctual variable,
the real value is selected when present, and the default one oth-
erwise; it corresponds to the merge construct in HEPTAGON.
The clock variable for each unpunctual variable needs an
input from the system telling whether the task generating the
encapsulated value has completed on time or not. We introduce
for each task call a fresh abstract function which provides this
information. It is the responsibility of the back-end to stub
these functions appropriately.
It is worth noting that by relaxing the type system to be a bit
more lenient on unpunctual arguments we could have allowed
interesting constructions, at the cost of additional compilation
efforts: since unpunctual tasks are not time-critical, it should
be possible to execute them one after another, waiting for the
previous task to terminate normally without killing it when
node check_command(door_command : command; door_map : int)
returns (safe_command : command)
let
safe_command = if door_map <> -1 then door_command else None;
tel
task check_commands(unpunctual door_commands : commandˆn; door_map : intˆn)
returns (safe_commands : commandˆn)
let
if ontime door_commands then
safe_commands = map<<n>> check_command(door_commands, door_map);
else
safe_commands = Noneˆn;
end
tel
Figure 1. Simplified implementation of a safety-critical function which ensures that there are no command for a train or platform door which is not aligned
with a corresponding platform or train door, respectively. The door_map array provides a valid description of which pairs of doors are aligned, and the
door_commands is the array of commands computed for each door. The latter is unpunctual as it results from a best-effort computation in a mission-critical
task; when commands are not computed in time, it is always safe for the passenger that the doors receive no commands.
a deadline is missed. At worst, the unpunctual task missing
its deadline could be preempted to ensure it does not use
resources (CPU, memory, etc.) which belong to any time-
critical task. Thus depending on the criticality of a task, the
behavior to follow when a data is not computed on time
would not be the same. If the task is time-critical, we use
the constructions introduced in this paper to program the
temporary transition to a degraded mode. If the task is not
time-critical then it can wait until its data are computed. This
solution may accumulate delay if multiple tasks miss their
deadline or the delay of a task can be compensated by another.
For this purpose, we could have allowed unpunctual arguments
to be passed to unpunctual tasks without declaring them as
unpunctual, but this would involve heavier changes in the type
system.
B. Distribution and parallel code generation
At this stage of our research, the code generation procedure
is only partially implemented and thus semi-automatic.
Like in LUSTRE, a HEPTAGON program can be seen as
a dataflow graph where vertices are operators or instances
of other nodes. A program is defined by its root node. All
nodes instanciated from a parent task node can be statically
scheduled by the HEPTAGON compiler into a single step
function. Calls to the node’s internal operators and child nodes
may even be inlined if desirable.5 After the program has been
compiled, we obtain a dataflow graph whose vertices are tasks
and whose edges are communications between these tasks.
In our case study, most dataflow operators are copies of
outputs of one task to the input of another, or field selection
where a subset of the data is being copied. Other operators,
such as arithmetic ones, are also encapsulated into tasks. The
punctuality of an encapsulating task is completely determined
by the type system which imposes that the operands and the
result of an operators must have the same punctuality.
In summary, the first transformation pass produces a
dataflow graph where, after inlining and encapsulation, all
5Recursion is forbidden.
vertices are tasks and where edges are communications. These
tasks must then be allocated and scheduled. Although the
HEPTAGON compiler has its own scheduler, it is intended
for pure sequential scheduling and for a totally different
optimisation goal. Thus, our approach relies on the existence
of external tools to allocate and schedule tasks. These tools
must take into account the cost of communications as well
as the individual execution cost of tasks. For instance, we
have implemented a back-end for the LOPHT [3] scheduler:
this back-end allow us to feed the scheduler with the list of
tasks, data dependencies, clocks and constraints. LOPHT then
produces a scheduling table for all these tasks. [6].
Basically, the allocator gives a color to each vertex in
the dataflow graph while the scheduler gives a topological
order to those vertices. In our framework, allocation just
splits punctual and unpunctual tasks. For each computation
resource—i.e. for each color in the dataflow graph—one may
generate sequential code. This code calls each task in the order
given by the scheduler. When the input of a task is produced
by another task on the same computation resource, a simple
data copy takes place. When the two tasks are allocated in
different computation resources, the generated code uses the
communication protocol described in the next section.
C. Partitioning and time-triggered communication protocol
Systems with mixed time-criticalities require a strong as-
surance on the worst case execution time (WCET) of most
safety critical tasks. However this is almost impossible to
achieve without temporal and spatial partitioning, due to the
shared resources of conventional multi-cores [16]. Concretely,
concurrent accesses on shared resources, such as a shared
L2 cache or a shared scratch-pad memory bank, result in
contentions, which prohibit timing analysis at the system
level. Building on partitioning techniques, we propose a
time-triggered communication protocol to realize contention-
avoidance and timing isolation.
A strict spatial partitioning requires independent physical
memory and computing units. This is for two reasons: first, to
keep the register and memory context of safety-critical tasks
away from malware or bugs; second, to avoid concurrent ac-
cesses on shared resources, including instruction caches. Such
spatial partitioning can be achieved on off-the-shelf hardware
platforms, such as the Zynq 7K [23]. It integrates an ARM
MPcore (Dual Cortex-A9) and a FPGA permitting asymmetric
multiprocessing (AMP) configurations. Each ARM core can
run its own software stack, set up separately in the shared
DDR or on chip memory (OCM). Precise timers and bus
arbitration policies can also be controlled. Moreover, building
on the embedded FPGA, a variety of memory and computing
units can be implemented, e.g., for communication buffers, and
for controlling external I/O. Therefore the time-critical and
non-time-critical tasks can be fully isolated on the physical
platform. This does come with a significant cost however,
as communications and DDR accesses from the time-critical
level must be temporally isolated from any other activity.
Such temporal isolation may dramatically reduce the effective
parallelism available in the program. In particular, to the best
of our knowledge, it is not possible to execute two time-
predictable tasks in parallel on such a platform.
Our time-triggered communication protocol aims at real-
izing sufficient temporal partitioning without destroying the
potential for parallel execution. This protocol controls not only
shared communication buffers by building access time frame
and deadline in order to avoid contentions. But it can also
tolerate timeout events in order to avoid delaying the time-
critical functions by non-time-critical ones. And it achieves
this inspite of the presence of communications between the
two levels.
In this protocol, each task is split into phases falling in one
of six classes:
• time-critical computing (TCCP),
• time-critical copy to buffer (TCTB),
• time-critical copy from buffer (TCFB),
• non-time-critical computing (NTCCP),
• non-time-critical copy to buffer (NTCTB), and
• non-time-critical copy from buffer (NTCFB).
To set the execution deadlines, we rely on a supplied WCET
for each of these phases. Fig. 2 shows a sample chronogram
of the time-triggered protocol. In this simple example, there
are two parallel execution chains, one for safety-time critical
tasks, another for mission critical ones, they are executed in
parallel on different CPUs.
Phase I: On the time-critical level, at the end of the date T0
that is the deadline of previous function, the TCTB function
is executed to copy the data to buffer. Its WCET W0 is used
to define its deadline T1 (T1 = T0 +W0).
On the non-time-critical level, T1 is the deadline for the
previous functions. It should be noted that this deadline is not
a hard one: late events are tolerated.
Phase II: The NTCFB function of the non-time-critical level
transfers the data from the buffer at date T1. Then the NTCCP
function deals with the data and generates the output results.
Finally the NTCTB function transfers the data to the buffer.
The sum of WCETs Y 0 + Y 1 + Y 2 of NTCFB, NTCCP and
NTCTB is used to define the date of T2. The temporal gap
between T1 and T2 can be filled by other TCCP functions
according to the task scheduling strategy. The WCET value
W1 should be less than T2− T1.
Phase III: The TCFB function copies the data from the
buffer when the data is ready, if no timeout takes place.
Otherwise the late event is handled appropriately by the second
TCCP task. The maximal WCET value of LCFB and of the
backup function defines the deadline date T3.
In fact, if missing a deadline on an unpunctual communi-
cation is harmless, a default value may be enough to react to
the timeout event. Otherwise, a more evolved backup function
is needed, and its WCET needs to be accounted for at design
time, to set up the timeout accordingly. On the other hand, if
a timeout should be considered as a fault, the approach is not
applicable and the task should not be considered as non-time-
critical; fail-safe or degraded mode transitions, or fault-tolerant
approaches might be considered.
It should be noted that, not only a communication from
non-time-critical to time-critical, but also time-unpredictable
communications between two time-critical tasks or two parallel
time-critical execution chains (operating in parallel on two
different CPUs) may be unpunctual. This feature makes the
protocol suitable for network-on-chip (NoC) systems, such as
the Kalray MPPA manycore processor [14]. On such a chip,
time-critical tasks can executed in parallel in the different clus-
ters, while implementing unpunctual communication between
clusters to reduce overhead and certification cost.
V. VALIDATION
As mentioned above, the PE application is coded accord-
ing to its original functional specification. This specification,
written in SysML, details functional and behavioral aspects,
risk levels (vital or non-vital), the component architecture,
communications and interfaces. We split the vital functions
into time critical and non-time critical ones according to their
timing requirements, but any atomic behavior is not broken
down.
Although the PE application is a reasonably simple use case,
it has more than 300 functional and behavioral requirements
already: it is a representative industrial SIL (Safety Integrity
Level) application. Many other application areas combine the
needs for computational components in the loop of safety-
critical control. From engine control to monitoring, control
engineers need computational tasks in order to improve tra-
jectories, leading to resource optimization, emission reduc-
tions, longer maintenance cycles, etc. Model-predictive control
(MPC) is one of the best representatives of such computational
control applications.6 Its applicability to real-time systems has
so far been limited by its time impredictability [25], making
it a prime candidate for mixed-time-critical execution.
Fig. 3 presents a simplified dataflow graph of the PE
application. The following safety requirements must be met
by time-critical tasks:
6http://www.mpc.berkeley.edu/mpc-course-material
Figure 2. Chronogram of ideal time-triggered communication protocol.
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1) train/platform doors may only open if properly aligned;
2) if the train is not immobilized, doors cannot be opened;
3) doors must be closed to allow the train to depart.
The non-time-critical part sets three other requirements:
1) open/close commands are issued according to the mis-
sion;
2) inform passengers of an imminent opening/closing;
3) send warnings to the traffic supervision when the pas-
senger exchange cannot be completed.
These last three requirements are handled by two non-time-
critical functions. The first one computes a mapping from train
doors to platform doors and vice versa, such that matching
doors are physically aligned. The second one uses this map-
ping to compute commands to be sent to the doors according
to the current mission.
To meet the safety requirements, these commands must be
checked. If a command breaks one of the requirements, it is
canceled: it is always safe, according to these requirements
to send no commands. This check relies on three time-
critical functions. First, the physical position of the platform
doors is retrieved. Then, the door mapping computed by the
corresponding mission-critical function is checked using these
physical positions and the current train position. Finally, the
commands are checked against this mapping and information
about the train docking state. The last requirement is ensured
by a fourth function which issues a departure authorization
when no commands have been sent for the last few seconds.
The application also has a non-critical logging function
which records the commands history.
We show in Listing 1 the HEPTAGON source code, declaring
two unpunctual variables, door map and door commands. The
generated C code is presented in Listing 2. Two functions
are generated, for the time-critical code and one for the non-
time-critical code, respectively. The communication functions
send and receive have the same parameters: an identifier for
the channel buffer, the address and the size of the payload,
and the time-criticality of the sender or receiver. The result
of the receive function is a boolean which indicates whether
the communication has been done on time or a timeout has
occurred. This boolean can only be false when communicating
from a non-time-critcical task to a time-critical one. The
communication mechanism is illustrated on a custom system
configuration and platform in the next subsection.
A. Hardware/software implementation
We selected an off-the-shelf hardware platform, the Zynq
7K SoC ZedBoard [24] as our experimental target. It provides
a pair of ARM cores and a FPGA. This flexible platform is
very popular in mixed critical execution environments and in
hardware-software codesign. In this paper, we leverage the
ARM cores for their flexibility and performance on typical
software stacks, and rely on the FPGA only for configuring
the local memory and bus interfaces, and for implementing
communication buffers.
As mentioned in Section IV-C, our first goal is to realize
a strict spatial partitioning on the Zynq 7K. This is achieved
through asymmetric multi-processing (AMP). The Zynq 7K
permits at least two kinds of AMP configurations [22], be-
tween two ARM cores and between ARM and FPGA based
soft-cores. We selected the ARM core-only AMP configuration
to suit our performance-driven implementation strategy:
• ARM core 1 executes the time-critical tasks in a bare-
metal environment. The software stack is allocated on
Listing 1. Snippet of the HEPTAGON implementation of the PE.
node passenger_exchange(train_position : int)
returns (safe_door_commands : commandˆn; departure_authorization : bool)
var
platform : int;
unpunctual door_map : intˆn;
safe_door_map : intˆn;
unpunctual door_commands : commandˆn;
let
platform = get_platform(train_position);
door_map = compute_door_map(platform);
safe_door_map = check_door_map(door_map, platform);
door_commands = compute_commands(door_map);
safe_door_commands = check_commands(door_commands, safe_door_map);
departure_authorization = check_departure_conditions(safe_door_commands);
tel
Listing 2. C code generated by the HEPTAGON compiler.
void passenger_exchange_tc(int train_position, command safe_door_commands[8],
bool* departure_authorization) {
int platform, door_map[8], safe_door_map[8];
command door_commands[8];
bool ontime1, ontime2;
get_platform(train_position, &platform);
send(0, &platform, sizeof(int), TC);
ontime1 = receive(1, door_map, sizeof(int) * 8, TC);
check_door_map(ontime1, door_map, safe_door_map);
ontime2 = receive(2, door_commands, sizeof(command) * 8, TC);
check_commands(ontime2, door_commands, safe_door_map, safe_door_commands);
check_departure_conditions(safe_door_commands, departure_authorization);
}
void passenger_exchange_ntc() {
int platform, door_map[8];
command door_commands[8];
receive(0, &platform, sizeof(int), NTC);
compute_door_map(platform, door_map);
send(1, door_map, sizeof(int) * 8, NTC);
compute_commands(door_map, door_commands);
send(2, door_commands, sizeof(command) * 8, NTC);
}
the on chip memory (OCM) of 256KB (code and data).
• ARM core 0 executes the non-time-critical and non-
critical tasks in a Linux environment: Petalinux [20]. The
software stack is allocated on the DDR (512MB).
• The communication buffers are implemented on the
FPGA.
Figure 4 details the hardware IPs used in the Vivado tool
chain [21] for our system configuration.
a) Processing system7 0: is the IP used to configure a
couple of ARM codes. We use almost all default configuration
values. It should be noticed that, CPU0 uses both L1 and
L2 caches, but CPU1 uses only the L1 cache, in order to
avoid concurrent access on the shared L2. The communication
buffers on the FPGA are not cached.
b) Proc sys reset 0: is the IP used to reset FPGA com-
ponents controlling by the Processing System.
c) Axi mem intercon: is the interconnection IP used to
connect the AXI master components with the AXI slave
ones. This is a 1 → 3 crossbar as there are one master
(processing element) and three slave components: memory
block, ZedBoard LEDs and switch GPIO. The latter two
interfaces are used during PE application timeout injection
and functional test.
d) MEM: is a block memory wrapper containing two
IPs, one for the AXI BRAM controller and the other one for
a block memory generator. In our implementation, we realize
a 32KB memory buffer.
The resource utilization metrics are presented in the table
below. Only a small fraction of the FPGA is used.
On the ARM Core1, tasks are time triggered relying on a
snoop control unit (SCU) 32 bits local timer. We experimented
with two ways to configure the timer: a fixed frequency static
value and a dynamic value derived from to executing task’s
WCET. Both of them were tested successfully.
As the ZedBoard Zynq 7K SoC can operate at 666 MHz, we
can set up a static timer reaching a relatively high frequency
such as 100 KHz, 500 KHz or even 1 MHz, to accomodate
multiperiodic schedules and a wide diversity of task WCET. A
“jiffies” counter is used to hold the number of time ticks that
have occurred since a task was initiated. At the end of the task,
Figure 4. Hardware IPs (Vivado tool chain) used in our implementation.
Resource Used Available Util%
Slice LUTs 2345 53200 4.40%
Slice Registers 2815 106400 2.64%
Block RAM Tile 8 140 5.71%
Figure 5. Mainly resource utilization ratio.
a comparison between the expected WCET and the measured
jiffies allows to determine if the deadline was reached.7 If
it did, the next task executes and the jiffies counter is reset
to zero. Otherwise, a loop spins until the expected deadline.
When using a dynamic timer, it is defined according to the
WCET of the operating task, with a “deadline” variable set to
detect to the WCET. The rest proceeds identically as with a
static counter.
The dynamic scheme requires slightly more code generation
effort but it saves CPU resources, saving the need to handle
intermediate interrupts. For example in the PE application, the
task’s largest WCET is 120× the shortest WCET, which means
at least 120 timer interrupts can be saved using a dynamic
timer.
On the ARM Core0, we did not yet realize time-triggered
execution on Linux, but enter a spin loop instead to check if
the data is ready. To avoid interferences on the communication
buffer due to round robin arbitration, we have to time-isolate
the non-time-critical side of the communication as well, which
doubles the WCET of the corresponding communication func-
tion. This overhead is very lightweight as the communication
function has a low cost compared with other components.
The chronogram of the execution is illustrated in Fig. 6;8
the digits correspond to the following tasks: (1) Get Platform,
7We do not attempt to deal with missed deadlines on time-critical tasks,
which should be handled as critical faults at another level (e.g., a degraded
mode of operation).
8The lengths are not on (timing) scale.
(2) Compute Door Map, (3) Check Door Map, (4) Compute
Commands, (5) Check Commands, (6) Check Departure Con-
ditions, (7) Logging Utility.
As we just presented, the time-critical communication func-
tion A runs in parallel with the spin loop, effectively wasting
parallel computing resources for a short time period. On the
other hand, for most of the execution, functions (3) and (4)
run in parallel, showing the benefit of our mixed time-critical
design. More complex applications and scalable platforms
would make even more effective use of the approach.
Listing 3. C structure of for unpunctual communication.
typedef struct communication
{
volatile int *ready;
// For unpunctual communication
volatile int *timeout;
volatile int *cycle_count;
volatile void *payload;
int size;
} communication_t;
Listing 3 details the language C structure dedicated to
unpunctual communications. This structure contains five fields,
ready signals that a communication packet is ready, timeout
informs about missing packets when reaching a timeout,
cycle count stores the packet’s logical instance cycle (a.k.a.
period), payload wraps the packet data and size represents the
size of the payload. We use the “C” and “D” communications
of Figure 6 to explain this C implementation.
As shown in the Figure 7, we declare a sender variable C
(type of communication t) on the non-time-critical side, and
a receiver variable D (type of communication t) on the time-
critical side.
e) The ready fields: of C and D point to a 32 bits physical
address allocated on the FPGA Mem Buffer—0x40000000.
Figure 6. Execution chronogram of PE application.
Figure 7. Implementation of the “C” and “D” communication of Figure 6.
The sender variable C produces the ready signal, it enables
ready once the packet payload has been copied to the buffer,
i.e., when the packet is ready for the receiver. The “ontime”
operator is implemented by checking the ready field at the
receiver side when the deadline date is reached. If ready is
not enabled, a timeout occurs. The receiver should execute a
backup function.
f) The timeout fields: of C and D point to the following
32 bits physical address—0x40000004. The receiver variable
D produces the timeout signal, it enables timeout when the
deadline date T3 is reached and packet payload is not yet
ready. That is to say, when the packet timeout occurs. The
sender variable C is the consumer; when it seens an enabled
timeout, it aborts the current packet transmission.
g) The cycle count fields: of C and D point to the next
32 bits physical address—0x40000008. The sender variable C
is the producer, the cycle count of the non-time-critical task is
sent to the receiver. If it is different from the receivers’, a full-
cycle delay accumulation occured. That means the sender and
the receiver have lost their synchronous association, which is
a more severe situation, but still one that the protocol aims to
tolerate. It may happen it the non-time-critical task is seriously
delayed due to a chaotic accumulation of interferences. In such
a case, the simplest approach would be to skip the upcoming
instances of the non-time-critical task(s) until the synchrony of
the cycle counts can be restored. Optimized methods to handle
such severe and accumulated delays are outside the scope of
this paper, but the reader interested in advanced strategies may
refer to [10].
h) The payload fields: of C and D point to the following
32 bits physical address—0x4000000C. To preserve timing
isolation, the packet’s contents is first copied from the sender
to the buffer, then from the buffer to the receiver.
The memory overhead of our time-triggered communication
protocol are is limited to the additional communication vari-
ables (cycle count, timeout and ready). On the PE application,
only 6 such variables are needed to implement the (two) cross-
time-criticality communications.
B. Early experiments
Our first experimental validation was to test the mixed-time-
critical version of PE application with its original functional
self-test, which takes the form of a set of scenario simulations.
This test was passed successfully, which proved that the time-
triggered protocol does not change the PE function.
Next, we replayed the functional test with an additional
timeout injection hazard. We did not change the test scenarios,
but inserted controllable delays in the functions (2) Compute
Door Map and (4) Compute Commands. Practically, these
delays took the form of simple device I/O on the Zync
platform, checking if the corresponding ZedBoard switch is
on. if yes, a random number of loop iterations were executed
in order to simulate a non-predictable delay. If this induces
a timeout, the backup function or default values are used, as
implemented in the mixed-time-critical synchronous program.
The trace of the PE application proved the absence of timing
violations or incorrect commands on the time-critical tasks.
As noticed earlier, when a huge delay affects the function
(2) or (4), delay accumulation may occur and the cycle count
fields of the sender and receiver may differ. Our current im-
plementation simply aborts the PE application by an exception
for now, as an illustration of the self-diagnosis potential of the
communication protocol. Of course, a complete implemen-
tation should skip some upcoming tasks and resynchronize
accordingly instead.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented an application where mixed criticality resides
at the application level, or even at function level, rather than
the system level. Moreover, all functions remain safety critical,
and the different criticalities we consider are focused on
timing predictability and requirements instead. Different time
predictability requirements allowed us to expose parallelism
and optimize resource utilization, compared to a much more
conservative timing isolation of all components. We demon-
strate the feasibility of hard real-time and parallel execution
of safety-critical tasks on a conventional embedded multicore
platform. A timing isolation protocol allows best-effort, func-
tionally validated tasks to communicate with hard real-time
ones, while (1) preserving timing compositionality, and (2)
satisfying all hard real-time constraints in the complete appli-
cation. To program and certify such applications, we proposed
an extension to a synchronous language enabling correct-by-
construction code generation and parallel execution on a mul-
tiprocessor platform. Based on this experience, we advocate
for a multidimensional approach to mixed criticality where
timing constraints are managed separately from other system
validation aspects. We also advocate for a holistic approach,
where the design flow of complex control applications takes
into account different levels of timing predictability: our pro-
posal is one step towards the construction of such a flow. We
encourage control engineers to detail the different admissible
modes, limiting the extent of hard real-time components, and
defining the hard real-time reactions to the late availability of
non-time-critical data.
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